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The impact of the Stability and Growth 
Pact on real economic growth: automatic 
mechanisms or policy discretion?
Paolo Savona* and Carlo Viviani **
*Professor of Economic Geopolitics at Scuola Superiore di Pubblica Amministrazione
**Professor of Economic Policy at Luiss-Guido Carli University.
The study was designed jointly by the two authors along the lines of a 1995 work of theirs on the
lack of logical foundations of the Maastricht parameters. The entire econometric check was
performed by Viviani. For further information write to cviviani@luiss.it.
The recession under way in the European Union and the threat of deflation
(which would appear to have hit Germany already) have spawned
increasingly frequent calls for modification of the Stability and Growth
Pact. The present article confirms the negative correlation of the rate of real
output growth with that of increase in current public expenditure but finds
a positive correlation of growth with the rate of increase in public capital
spending, private investment, tax to GDP ratio, and an indicator of the net
profit rate. The policy prescription is for the urgent modification of the rules
of the Pact, exempting public investment from its constraints subject to the
assessment of the Ecofin Council. The markets would be receptive to such a
change if the EU instituted clear new rules, not just reinterpreting those now
in being under the pressure of contingent factors. On this basis, we find that
Italy’s economic crisis is due in part to the misconceived fiscal and
monetary policy rules of the European Union.
1. Framing the problem and survey of the literature
The Stability and Growth Pact signed at Amsterdam in 1997 amended
the excessive deficit procedure introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in
1992. Both accords posit the inadequacy of discretionary fiscal policy in
responding to shocks and prescribe reliance on automatic stabilizers.
The stabilizer indicated by the Pact, however, leaves member states the
option, hence the discretionary power, to decide on levels of revenue
and expenditure and the distribution of the latter between current and
investment spending. This creates complications for the interpretation
of the efficacy of such a fiscal policy design over and above those1 M. Friedman (1972), “Comments on the Critics”, Journal of Political Economy. 
2 A. Blinder and R. Solow (1973), “Does Fiscal Policy Matter?”, Journal of Public Economics.
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inherent in the problem, which for that matter have never been resolved
on the theoretical plane. These features of the Pact increase the room
for divergence in evaluating its effects on real economic growth.
The European Union’s institutional framework for fiscal policy has
been repeatedly questioned, and all the more frequently of late in view
of the mounting concern over Europe’s poor economic performance.
By comparison with the past we find a changed climate of opinion on
the Pact, with a stream of private and official criticism, some of it quite
severe, countered by as many endorsements of its viability. Critiques
run the gamut from positive assessment of the Pact’s policy usefulness
to condemnation of the adverse economic effects of its inflexible
application. The idea of the urgent need for modification, attenuation
or reinterpretation of the Pact has been gaining ground.
After a brief premise setting out the state of theoretical understanding
in this field and the findings of several empirical studies, we offer
further econometric evaluations to test the logical arguments for the
effectiveness of the fiscal policy arrangements laid down in the
European treaties. In particular, for the EU countries we estimate the
effects on economic growth of such variables as interest rates, taxation,
inflation, openness to foreign competition and real investment, with
special focus on the impact of the different types of public spending.
The conclusion, in brief, is that the automatic checks on current
public spending should be maintained but that investment spending
should shift to a discretionary regime. The study implies a number of
suggestions for the design of an economic policy that can put the
European Union back on the path of growth.
1.1 The debate on crowding-out. The theoretical debate on crowding-out
first arose in the United States in the 1970s, focusing on the negative
long-term effects of budget deficits highlighted by Milton Friedman in
1972
1 and the way in which they are financed, discussed by Blinder and
Solow in 1973.
2 Barro introduced the “Ricardian” hypothesis,
maintaining that on the assumption of perfectly rational agents an
increase in the deficit has a negative intergenerational effect on private3 R.J. Barro (1974), “Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?”, Journal of Political Economy.
4 Confindustria (1977), Operazione Sviluppo, typescript, Rome.
5 F. Modigliani, T. Jappelli and M. Pagano (1985), “L’impatto della politica fiscale e dell’inflazione
sul risparmio nazionale: il caso italiano”, Moneta e credito.
6 D.A. Aschauer (1985), “Fiscal Policy and Aggregate Demand”, American Economic Review;
(1989a) “Is Public Expenditure Productive?”, Journal of Monetary Economics; (1989b), “Does
Public Capital Crowd Out Private Capital?”, Journal of Monetary Economics.
7 J.M. Keynes (1942), “Budgetary Policy” in Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Vol. 27,
Macmillan.
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demand. Hence the net effect on aggregate demand of a larger budget
deficit was held to be nil.
3
Alongside the economic effects of budget deficits, other analysts
stressed the “financial” effects. For Italy in particular it was argued that
private investment was crowded out by the combination of excessive
demand for savings on the part of the State and the ceiling on credit
expansion given by total domestic credit. In 1977 Guido Carli and
Paolo Savona, following the launch by the Confederation of Italian
Industry of its “Operazione Sviluppo” (operation growth) plan, kicked
off a wide-ranging discussion of crowding-out.
4 A decade later Franco
Modigliani and others confirmed the crowding-out effect of the private
by the public sector at the financial level.
5
In the 1980s, while going more deeply into these issues, the
discussion also turned to the effects of public investment both on
private investment demand and on private sector productivity. Most
notably D.A. Aschauer, in a series of articles, pointed out that the
decline in US productivity beginning in the 1970s may have been due
to the decline in public investment.
6 By increasing the productivity of
capital, in the medium term public investment would generate an
increase in demand for capital. Hence the effects of public spending on
current and on capital account were seen as distinct, the latter being
credited with direct and indirect effects favouring real economic
growth. This recovered the original spirit of the Keynesian approach to
budget policy. In an article in the Times in 1942, Keynes wrote: “I
should aim at having a surplus on the ordinary budget, which would be
transferred to the capital budget, thus gradually replacing deadweight
debt by productive or semi-productive debt. … I should not aim at
attempting to compensate cyclical fluctuations by means of the
ordinary budget, I should leave this duty to the capital budget.”
78 A. Munnell (1992), “Policy Watch: Infrastructure Investment and Economic Growth”, Journal of
Economic Perspectives.
9 I. Argmón, J.M. González-Páramo and J.M. Roldán (1997), “Evidence of Public Spending
Crowding-Out from a Panel of OECD Countries”, Applied Economics.
10 A. Alesina, S. Ardagna, R. Perotti and F. Schiantarelli (1999), “Fiscal Policy, Profits and
Investment”, NBER Working Paper Series, No. 7207.
11 F. Giavazzi and M. Pagano (1990), “Can severe fiscal contractions be expansionary? Tales of two
small European countries”, NBER Working Paper Series, No. 3372.
12 A. Alesina and R. Perotti (1995), “Fiscal expansions and adjustments in OECD countries”,
Economic Policy, No. 21; (1997), “Fiscal adjustments in OECD countries: composition and
macroeconomic effects”, IMF Staff Papers, 44.
13 International Monetary Fund (1996), “Fiscal challenges facing industrial countries”, World
Economic Outlook, Chap. 3, IMF, Washington.
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Many studies have confirmed these conclusions, such as those of
Munnell
8 and, more recently, Argimón et al.
9 They find significant
crowding-in effects of public capital spending and crowding-out
effects of current spending. Though they cite different causes, Alesina
et al. (1999) also confirm the effect.
10
1.2 The effects of budget adjustments. When the Treaty of Maastricht
was signed, it was immediately clear that a good number of countries
would have to make very substantial budget adjustments to meet the
Economic and Monetary Union parameters. A part of the economic
literature posed the problem of the economic consequences of these
adjustments, i.e. whether the impact would be Keynesian or Ricardian,
which is to say whether the necessary reduction of the ratio of deficit to
GDP would result in economic contraction or expansion.
In 1990 Giavazzi and Pagano studied two quantitatively important
cases of budget adjustment: Ireland (1987-1989) and Denmark (1983-
1986).
11 They concluded that in these instances the magnitude of the
budgetary contraction had been such as to change expectations on
future fiscal policy and hence on individual incomes; that is, they found
a non-linear response to restrictive fiscal policy measures. This means
that in the case of small-scale budget adjustments Keynesian effects
prevail, but for major corrections the Ricardian effect dominates.
Alesina and Perotti emphasized the effect of fiscal consolidation on
agents’ expectations, but distinguishing between the composition and
the magnitude of the adjustment.
12 Essentially the thesis, adopted by
the IMF as well,
13 is that “fiscal consolidations are more likely to14 F. Giavazzi, T. Jappelli and M. Pagano (2000), “Searching for non-linear effects of fiscal policy:
Evidence from industrial and developing countries”, European Economic Review, 44.
15 R. Perotti (1996), “Fiscal Consolidation in Europe: Composition Matters”, American Economic
Review Papers and Proceedings, 86.
16 P. Savona and C. Viviani (1995), L’Europa dai piedi d’argilla. Basi empiriche, fondamenti logici
e conseguenze economiche del Trattato di Maastricht, Scheiwiller, Milan.
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stabilize the debt-GDP ratio when the budget improvement is obtained
by cutting public wages and pension benefits.”
14 Furthermore,
“because cuts in public employment and transfers programs are
politically much more costly than, say, capital-spending cuts, perhaps
only governments that are determined to carry out a lasting
consolidation undertake them.”
15
The IMF itself, defining as “aggressive” those budget adjustments
amounting to more than 1.5 per cent of GDP for at least two years and
as “successful” those that reduce the debt/GDP ratio by at least 3 points
in two years (IMF, 1996), contended that of the 63 aggressive
adjustments it counted between 1970 and 1993, only 14 were
associated with an increase in GDP, a decrease in unemployment,
lower interest rates and exchange rate appreciation. In short, it
confirmed the non-constancy of the effects of such fiscal policy
measures.
From another angle,
16 it has also been maintained that the
convergence parameters were not the objective of European
unification but a means to it and that they should accordingly not be
made into a “fetish” (as, unhappily, they have). Setting the deficit
cap of 3 per cent of GDP, while understandable owing to the
pseudo-Keynesian excesses of the past and desirable as an
“external constraint” on distorting fiscal conduct, nevertheless
remained an act devoid of rational foundation. And no
consideration was given to the relation between the rigidity of this
parameter and the discretion accorded monetary policy, with a 4.5
per cent ceiling on M3 expansion (never complied with, moreover)
as the intermediate target to achieve the final objective of 2 per cent
consumer price inflation. This target too was not attained until over
two years after its announcement, and only in conditions of lower
output growth. As for fiscal policy, one certainly cannot speak of
European monetary policy success.17 See the survey in Banca d’Italia (2001), Fiscal Rules, in particular F. Balassone and D. Franco
(2001), “EMU Fiscal Rules: A New Answer to an Old Question”, id.
18 R. Barrell, I. Hurst and A. Pina (2003), “Fiscal Targets, Automatic Stabilizers and their Effects on
Output”, in Banca d’Italia, The Impact of Fiscal Policy.
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1.3 Fixed rules and fiscal policy. A fixed fiscal policy rule is no theoretical
novelty.
17 The Stability Pact, according to its advocates, was needed
partly because of the lack of automatic mechanisms and a clear
sequence in the excessive deficit procedure set out in the Treaty
(Article 104), which could have resulted, in practice, in a relaxation of
fiscal discipline within EMU. Moreover, within a monetary union the
retention of national autonomy might have resulted in less prudent
deficit decisions, thanks to the greater ease of placing government
securities in a larger financial market. As past experience teaches, the
possible premium demanded by the market would not be a
disincentive to larger deficits, while it is all but certain that the pressure
exerted by a greater supply of securities at one point in the system
would mean a corresponding upward pressure on yields for the entire
union, at the expense of the “virtuous” countries. Finally, deficit
ceilings also lower the risk that excessive deficits in a major country (to
“save” a government in difficulty, say) or in all the major countries will
translate into excessive monetary creation by the European Central
Bank, thus undermining the independence of monetary policy.
All these considerations led to the creation of a fixed fiscal rule
embodied in the Stability Pact, which prescribes that the medium-term
budget must be “close to balance or in surplus”. Countries can stray
from this objective only in recession, and preferably by means of
automatic stabilizers. As we have already noted, the rule makes no
distinction between current spending and investment. That is, the
assumption is that public spending carries “Ricardian” implications
regardless of its composition, by the very fact of being discretional.
This thesis is not logically coherent, nor is it supported by most
empirical studies.
This is the view, among others, of Barell, Hurst and Pina, based on a
simulation, using the NiGEM model, of the effects of a permanent
increase in public investment spending of 1 per cent of GDP from 2002
on.
18 They find a sizable, lasting impact on real economic growth, albeit
moderated by the effects of a likely rise in nominal interest rates owing19 A. Brunila, M. Buti and J. in’t Veld (2000), “Cyclical Stabilisation Under the Stability and Growth
Pact: How Effective are Automatic Stabilizers?” in Banca d’Italia, The Impact of Fiscal Policy.
20 We have run econometric tests also for longer time lags than the two years shown in the tables
and in the appendix. The results are omitted for simplicity, but it should be borne in mind that our
assertions concerning the results beyond two years are not mere logical extrapolations but are
based on empirical evidence.
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to the monetary policy rules, and little risk of violating the Stability Pact
rules. Further, they show that automatic stabilizers have little capacity to
absorb supply-side shocks. Using the same econometric model, Brunila
and others estimate that the automatic stabilizers reduce the volatility of
growth by 11 per cent in the euro area and by 5 per cent in Italy.
19
Another estimate by the authors using the QUEST model checks the
capacity of automatic stabilizers to buffer shocks, distinguishing
according to the origin of the shock. There is good capacity (between 20
and 30 per cent) for consumption-side shocks, much less effectiveness
against private investment and export shocks (3 to 10 per cent and 5 to
14 per cent, respectively).
2. Data, estimates, comment
The source for our data is the OECD Economic Outlook Database.
We  have taken the data for all EU countries except Greece,
Luxembourg and Portugal from 1960 to 2002. The variables and their
abbreviations are given in Table 1. The estimates are summarized in
Table 2. Details are reported in the appendix. The econometric tests
were performed with fixed-effect panel data.
Let us now very briefly summarize our reading of the two sets of
regressions.
The variation in current public expenditure has negative coefficients
both for the current and for the lagged period but is econometrically
significant only for the lagged one, not rejecting the Ricardian thesis of
crowding-out and potentially undermining the idea implicit in the
Stability Pact that automatic stabilizers can themselves help pull the
economy out of recession. An increase in current spending does not
appear to be effective in the short run and worsens the situation in the
medium term.
20270
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The variation in public investment has a positive coefficient and is
highly significant for growth both in the current and in the lagged
period. This supports the thesis that not all discretionary public
spending is negative or neutral (through the Ricardian equivalence) for
growth. A policy of public investment could thus create conditions
more favourable to growth. The relevant point is not, therefore,
whether the spending is discretionary or automatic but the nature of
the expenditure. It is interesting that investment spending has a
positive effect on GDP growth, in the current period, suggesting effects
deriving from the incorporation of their deferred returns into
expectations or demand effects reinforcing longer-run expectations.
The variation in the ratio of taxation to GDP shows a positive
correlation with growth in the current period and a statistically not
significant  relation in the lagged period. In this case, there may be a
Ricardian effect on expectations (lower expected future taxes), which
could begin to be felt in the period to which the regressions refer, when
many European countries made substantial budget adjustments by
raising taxes.
The difference between the growth and real interest rates is highly
significant with a one-year lag and not significant for subsequent years.
Table 1 - The variables
Variable Symbol Abbreviation
Real GDP per capita of working age pop. Ypc PCGDP
Potential GDP Ypot GDPPOT
GDP at 1995 prices and PPP Y95 GDP95
Growth rate of per capita GDP g GR
Difference between growth rate and real interest rate g – il – pc GMENOR2
Public expenditure on current account Gc GCORR
Public investment expenditure Gin GINV
Total tax revenue T TAX
Long-term interest rate il IL
Inflation rate (consumer prices) pc INFL
Exports eX EXP
Imports iM IMP
International trade exposure index iaci EXPO2
Capital formation in private sector Ipr INVBUS271
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This renews the evidence for the relevance of monetary policy to real
economic developments, which central banks have frequently denied
in order to minimize their responsibility for slower growth. If real
Table 2 - Summary of estimates
REGRESSION 1: PANEL WITH CURRENT AND LAGGED FISCAL VARIABLES
Coefficient Standard error t-stat
(g – il – pc) (-1) 0.102 0.041 2.49
(g – il – pc) (-2) -0.032 0.030 -1.08
∆log(Gc/Ypot) -1.909 5.131 -0.37
∆log(Gc/Ypot)(-1) -19.423 5.402 -3.59
∆log(Gin/Ypot) 3.448 0.887 3.89
∆log(Gin/Ypot)(-1) 2.268 0.835 2.71
∆log(T/Ypot) 13.138 3.394 3.87
∆log(T/Ypot)(-1) 4.775 3.465 1.38
∆log(iaci) 23.284 3.413 6.82
∆log(Ipr/Ypot)(-1) 4.415 1.701 2.60
R-squared 0.70 F-statistic 44.73
Adjusted R-squared 0.67 Durbin-Watson 1.89
REGRESSION 2: PANEL WITH LAGGED FISCAL VARIABLES
Coefficient Standard error t-stat
(g – il – pc) (-1) 0.137 0.046 3.00
(g – il – pc) (-2) -0.051 0.034 -1.48
∆log(Gc/Ypot)(-1) -17.418 6.040 -2.88
∆log(Gin/Ypot)(-1) 2.765 0.913 3.03
∆log(T/Ypot)(-1) 6.357 3.639 1.75
∆log(iaci) 22.896 3.490 6.56
∆log(Ipr/Ypot)(-1) 6.538 1.697 3.85
R-squared 0.61 F-statistic 45.46
Adjusted R-squared 0.57 Durbin-Watson 1.94
Notes: (1) The dependent variable is the percentage growth rate of GDP, as a variation of the natural log of real
GDP per capita of the working-age population (15-64) multiplied by 100. – (2) To show the elasticities, all
variables are estimated as variations of natural logs. This also avoids problems connected with the non-
stationarity of time series. – (3) Fiscal variables and private investment are given as ratios to potential GDP. –
(4) Exposure to world trade is given as the sum of imports and exports as a ratio to GDP at purchasing power
parities and 1995 prices. – (5) The sample for this specification excludes Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal. –
(6) The period for the estimates is 1987-2002.272
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interest rates are too high in comparison to current real GDP growth,
capital is destroyed and future growth rates are lowered.
International trade openness is highly significant in explaining
growth, with a positive coefficient for the current period. This supports
the thesis that European economic growth is export-led, which should
convince the monetary authorities to change their attitude concerning
the exchange rate, to pursue an active policy rather than the benign
neglect that led first to sharp depreciation and then to an equally sharp
appreciation of the euro against the dollar. This affected the euro area’s
foreign trade both directly and indirectly through the substantial
increase in exchange rate volatility.
Finally, the variation in total fixed investment has a significant,
positive correlation with growth, as is only to be expected if one’s
model takes the increase in the capital stock as a relevant factor.
Regression 2 broadly confirms the results of regression 1, though
with lesser econometric significance.
3. Conclusion: Has the Stability and Growth Pact helped or hurt
EU growth?
If we limited our evaluation just to the present state of the European
economy, our judgment of the Stability and Growth Pact signed at
Amsterdam would have to be negative. We would be led to maintain
that it has produced neither an acceptable rate of real economic
growth nor a satisfactory curb on budget deficits, which have
continued to expand.
Yet such a reading would not be proper, owing to the large number
of variables in play. The state of the EU economy is the fruit of the
world economic cycle, which in turn has depended mainly on trends
in the United States and the geopolitical events in the wake of
September 11, 2001, onto which a rigid interpretation of the Pact was
grafted.
One can disentangle the role played by the Stability and Growth Pact
from the impact of world economic and geopolitical developments on
Europe if one resorts to the standard method of economists, namely the
adoption of “heroic hypotheses,” those simplifying assumptions whose273
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logical validity has been the object of ironic commentary both within
and outside the profession.
Logical argument, practical observations and econometric
evaluations concur on the failure of the automatic mechanisms on
which the Pact is based. All three suggest the need to try discretionary
policies again, within a framework of rules that impose some
operational limits.
Bearing all these caveats firmly in mind, we feel that we have
succeeded in producing a set of policy prescriptions, set forth below,
whose validity is not rejected:
a) the automatic treatment of deficits centring on a budgetary balance
that fails to distinguish between current and investment spending is
contraindicated for the growth of the euro area;
b) by contrast, distinguishing between current spending in balance
(i.e., regulated by automatic stabilizers) and capital spending in
deficit (on a discretionary basis, but under collegial European
control) can contribute to growth;
c) raising taxes in order to cut the current deficit has beneficial effects
on growth in the short term;
d) a monetary policy that keeps real interest rates higher than the GDP
growth rate will slow the pace of economic expansion;
e) openness to international trade has a positive effect on the growth of
the euro area economy;
f) there is a strict relation between capital formation and the growth of
the euro-area economy.
These hypotheses not being rejected, the logical conclusion
deriving from our examination of the performance of the European
economy is that the level of national budget deficits should 
not depend on the Pact, meaning that the Amsterdam accord 
requires correction, leaving it up to the politicians whether to call 
it a “reinterpretation”, a “temporary suspension” or an actual
“amendment”. In making this decision, however, we must be aware
that the markets are not entirely devoid of the capacity to read the
situation and have clearly seen that the Stability Pact has stymied
European economic growth. Yet it is also true that the markets, and
most notably the foreign exchange market, react adversely to
statements or proposals for abandoning the Pact. On the basis of the21 The problem of time inconsistency in economic policy was raised by F. Kidland and E.S.
Prescott (1977), “Rules rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans”, Journal of
Political Economy. A well-known article by J.B. Taylor observes that rules must not be interpreted
mechanically but must form part of a multiperiod strategy that policy-makers commit themselves
to in order to reap the benefits, in terms of credibility, of the rules. For monetary policy, this means
a commitment to lower interest rates for a given inflation rate (J.B. Taylor, (1993), “Discretion
versus Policy Rules in Practice”, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy).
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research to date
21 and logical analysis, markets should reject the
abandonment or mere reinterpretation of the Pact but should
welcome a change in its rules in line with the econometric
relationships that we have tested in this article, which is to say less
current public spending and more investment. In theory, this is
tantamount to saying that the markets will reward transparency,
realism, and clarity in fiscal policy (as in monetary policy) and punish
policies based on contingent needs and carried out in such a way as to
suggest that they are merely circumventing the rules and reverting to
fiscal laxity. In a word, there is a real problem here, namely
modification of the Pact, and a psychological problem, namely the
correct communication of the reason for doing so.
The new, revised version of the Pact must accordingly retain the rule
of budgetary balance on current account but should permit deficit
spending for public investment, preferably under the control of Ecofin.
Where current balance has yet to be attained, the course to follow in
the short run is to raise taxes. If this is impossible, then the solution is to
cut expenditure. However, as the net effect of deflation due to higher
taxes and reflation due a Ricardian impact on expectations is unknown,
our own preference is for a mix of tax increases and current spending
cuts, at member countries’ discretion.
Based on our own research and that of other scholars, we agree with
the calls for the rapid launch of a European public investment
programme that can bring private investment in its wake, along the
lines of the Tremonti-Van Miert plan that has recently been suggested,
rejected, and resurrected.
Finally, let us offer three observations that are outside the scope of
the present article, strictly speaking, but closely bound up with the
issue of the Amsterdam pact.
First is the target of lowering member countries’ national public debt
to 60 per cent of GDP. This target should be suspended to avoid piling275
•The impact of the Stability and Growth Pact on real economic growth: automatic mechanisms or policy discretion?
on restraints on growth and to permit better evaluation of the way in
which the debt is distributed within the national segments of the
European financial market. Italy, condemned to years and years of
deflationary policy in order to meet the convergence criteria, is running
a primary budget surplus that would actually have to be increased in
order to comply with the European pact.
Second is the degree of competition, which needs to be heightened
to complete the transfer for curbing inflation from the money supply to
economic competition. With the Council’s mandate, the ECB should be
prodded to pay greater attention to the exchange rate of the euro, an
indispensable part of its mandate to safeguard monetary stability,
which to date it has interpreted as a strictly internal euro area affair.
Third, there is the presumption of the “neutrality of the money
supply” for economic growth. Maintaining real long-term interest rates
above the rate of growth means the destruction of capital, i.e. a
reduction in the rate of capitalization of the European economy, which
is not just the result of investment flows.
In conclusion, we should like to emphasize that in our discussion of
the state of the European economy we have generally avoided specific
reference to Italy. We feel that its poor performance is due to the
imperfect instruments instituted by the European treaties and by their
restrictive application to both fiscal and monetary policy. Italy’s
problems are of European origin, given that the structural conditions in
which the Italian economy operates have not worsened, indeed have
improved somewhat, while the growth rate has declined. This pattern
is closely connected with three elements: i) the illusions provoked by
the initial depreciation of the euro, which deferred adjustment of the
conditions of production, and now the severe loss of competitiveness
caused by revaluation; ii) the maintenance of a fiscal policy even more
rigid than the European average in order to lower the ratio of debt to
GDP; and iii) the elimination, under the European policy, of Italy’s
traditional economic policy instruments for dealing with the country’s
enormous regional and sectoral disparities.Appendix
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Table 1 - Regression 1 - Current and lagged variables
Dependent Variable: GRPCT?
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights)
Sample: 1987 2002
Included observations: 16
Number of cross-sections used: 12
Total panel (balanced) observations: 192
Convergence achieved after 16 iterations
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
GMENOR2?(-1) 0.101777 0.040856 2.491112 0.0137
GMENOR2?(-2) -0.032716 0.030174 -1.084237 0.2798
D(LGCORR?) -1.908442 5.130679 -0.371967 0.7104
D(LGCORR?(-1)) -19.42253 5.402124 -3.595350 0.0004
D(LGINV?) 3.447722 0.886820 3.887735 0.0001
D(LGINV?(-1)) 2.268340 0.835515   2.714901 0.0073
D(LTAX?) 13.13819 3.394243 3.870729 0.0002
D(LTAX?(-1)) 4.774970 3.465459 1.377875 0.1701
D(LOG(EXPO2?)) 23.28427 3.412868 6.822493 0.0000
D(LINV2?(-1)) 4.415177 1.700712 2.596075 0.0103
Fixed Effects
_AUS—C 1.917704 _SPA—C 1.778738
_BEL—C 1.941216 _UK—C 2.222670
_GER—C 1.373661 _ITA—C 1.646428
_DK—C 1.392752 _NED—C 1.803027
_FIN—C 1.979768 _SWE—C 1.386380
_FRA—C 1.446656 _IRL—C 4.038178
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.703101 Mean dependent var 2.600036
Adjusted R-squared  0.666425 S.D. dependent var 2.419767
S.E. of regression 1.397559 Sum squared resid 332.0392
Log likelihood -299.7448 F-statistic 44.73169
Durbin-Watson stat 1.890573 Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.632560 Mean dependent var 2.169168
Adjusted R-squared 0.587170 S.D. dependent var 2.175129
S.E. of regression 1.397560 Sum squared resid 332.0396
Durbin-Watson stat 1.847436279
•The impact of the Stability and Growth Pact on real economic growth: automatic mechanisms or policy discretion?
Table 2 - Regression 2 - Lagged variables
Dependent Variable: GRPCT?
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights)
Sample: 1987 2002
Included observations: 16
Number of cross-sections used: 12
Total panel (balanced) observations: 192
Convergence achieved after 9 iterations
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
GMENOR2?(-1) 0.136805 0.045661 2.996111 0.0031
GMENOR2?(-2) -0.051162 0.034467 -1.484347 0.1395
D(LGCORR?(-1)) -17.41794 6.040501 -2.883526 0.0044
D(LGINV?(-1)) 2.764898 0.913141 3.027899 0.0028
D(LTAX?(-1)) 6.357350 3.639394 1.746815 0.0824
D(LOG(EXPO2?)) 22.89620 3.490399 6.559767 0.0000
D(LINV2?(-1)) 6.538113 1.696517 3.853844 0.0002
Fixed Effects
_AUS—C 1.770510 _SPA—C 1.966017
_BEL—C 2.004596 _UK—C 2.183934
_GER—C 1.394292 _ITA—C 1.785370
_DK—C 1.458306 _NED—C 1.878252
_FIN—C 2.130417 _SWE—C 1.531658
_FRA—C 1.569803 _IRL—C 4.170248
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.6119 Mean dependent var 2.4958
Adjusted R-squared 0.5715 S.D. dependent var 2.2299
S.E. of regression 1.4596 Sum squared resid 368.5970
Log likelihood -313.6471 F-statistic 45.4612
Durbin-Watson stat 1.9429 Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.592105 Mean dependent var 2.169168
Adjusted R-squared 0.549665 S.D. dependent var 2.175129
S.E. of regression 1.459664 Sum squared resid 368.5972
Durbin-Watson stat 1.964753